Abstract: To create sustainable, adaptive and resilient societies we need to develop a proper understanding of infrastructure risk. This research improves such understanding by examining widespread failures of interdependent infrastructure networks from extreme climate events. By subjecting infrastructure networks to extreme climate loading, we construct ensembles of direct failure sets that lead to cascading indirect failures across topological infrastructure networks. Such analysis produces two results: (1) Estimations of the topological fragility of infrastructure networks, and (2) Infrastructure vulnerability quantification in terms of spatial affects on service provision and customers using networked infrastructures. Producing multiple failure sets provides a wide range of possible outcomes, helping to build infrastructure failure profiles. Insights from risk analysis strengthen our understanding of infrastructure failures and are used to inform resilience-building activities for effective infrastructure provision.
I. Introduction
Infrastructure sustainability, adaptation or resilience is better understood by examining national infrastructure risk. In the context of this research, national infrastructures represent civil and technological structures that provide goods and services to industries, governments and households operating at regional and national scales. In particular infrastructures such as electricity, gas, rail, road, and ICT are among critical national infrastructures, constituting the backbone of society and economy 1, 2 . For better performance and service provision national infrastructures are highly interdependent systems through physical, technological or economic mechanisms 3 .Though interdependencies are desirable for maintaining infrastructure functionality and service delivery, they become disadvantageous during widespread failures, which result in failure cascading effects that propagate damages from one infrastructure to another 4 . 5, 6, 7 . National scale climate change risk assessment policy statements have emphasized the imminent risks to critical national infrastructures in the present and future 8, 9 . Climate risk modeling is inherently complex due to systematic uncertainties that propagate from extreme climate hazards towards infrastructure responses and failure impacts 10 . For critical national infrastructures a system-of-systems (SoS) approach is required for modeling escalating failures that affect multiple systems and multiple participants 11 . In this paper we present a SoS framework where infrastructures represent systems of interdependent spatial networks that are exposed to probabilistic extreme hazard scenarios.
Infrastructures are spatially distributed systems spread over large geographic areas. Further there are several components or assets within each infrastructure and across infrastructures that are connected physically or through flow of information. As such an overall spatial network topology can be identified to build a unified representation of infrastructures 12 . Extreme climate loading conditions initiate random failures of network assets and the topology determines the further propagation of these failures across entire networks 13 . Following network damages the SoS risks are quantified in terms of the consequences in terms of spatial damage impacts, demographic disruption impacts and interdependent economic loss impacts 14 .
The climate risk analysis methodology proposed in this paper aims to compute the overall risk of failure of infrastructure networks when exposed to multiple probabilistic climate hazards. By subjecting infrastructure networks to extreme climate loading, we construct ensembles of direct asset failure sets that lead to cascading indirect failures across topological infrastructure networks. Such analysis produces two results: (i) Estimations of the topological fragility of infrastructure networks, and (ii) Infrastructure vulnerability quantification in terms of spatial affects on service provision and customers using networked infrastructures. Producing multiple failure sets provides a wide range of possible outcomes, helping to build infrastructure failure profiles. Insights from risk analysis strengthen our understanding of infrastructure failures and are used to inform resilience-building activities for effective infrastructure provisions.
In the sections that follow we first explain the formulation for calculating interdependent infrastructure risk for extreme climate hazards. Next we present the underlying SoS framework that needs to be constructed for implementing the different components of the risk calculations. This is followed by a sample case-study demonstration for a national-scale network and hazard.
II. Quantifying infrastructure risk
Infrastructure risk is broadly quantified as the product of the probabilities and consequences of network failures conditional upon probabilistic extreme climate hazards 10 . Within the context of this paper, reliability is the measure of the probability of failure, which is studied at the individual assets level and then at the infrastructure network level. For damage assessment the focus lies in estimating the customer losses and infrastructure output degradations, which ultimately are converted to economic losses a scale levels.
Probabilistic extreme climate loading is quantified in terms of its spatial magnitude vector and joint probability distribution infrastructure asset functionality through a state function state and denotes a 'non-failed' state. Also we define two variables: (i) conditional probability of failure of an ass loading , (ii) : The damage associated with the failure of the asset. For the entire infrastructure network, consisting of states collected into a binary vector describing which assets have failed and which have not failed. In particular network reliability, damages and risk depend upon the elements in When exposed to the hazard there are many possible failure combinations of assets that result in network failure. In the most exhaustive scenario there are possible combinations, but in reality fewer combinations can capture most of the failures. The vector defined before represents just one of the possible mechanism. We define the vector the tensor overall network failure. The infrastructure network risk ( paper is based on: (i) estimating the combined asset failure probabilities ( ( ) due to multiple failure mechanisms, and (ii) repeating the calculations over multiple hazard loadings . This is shown in Equation (1) below and Probabilistic extreme climate loading is quantified in terms of its spatial magnitude vector and joint probability distribution . To calculate risk we first represent an infrastructure asset functionality through a state function , such that denotes a 'failed' failed' state. Also we define two variables: (i) conditional probability of failure of an asset (fragility) when subjected to the external hazard : The damage associated with the failure of the asset. For the entire infrastructure network, consisting of assets, functionality depends on all the asset ollected into a binary vector , whose elements are either 0 or 1 which assets have failed and which have not failed. In particular network reliability, damages and risk depend upon the elements in .
ard there are many possible failure combinations of assets that result in network failure. In the most exhaustive scenario there are possible combinations, but in reality fewer combinations can capture most of the failures. The vector defined before represents just one of the possible failure states and is defined here as a . We define the vector to represent the failure mechanism and as the collection of failure combinations that contribute to overall network failure. The infrastructure network risk ( ) formulation proposed in this paper is based on: (i) estimating the combined asset failure probabilities ( e to multiple failure mechanisms, and (ii) repeating the calculations over multiple This is shown in Equation (1) below and summarized in Figure 1 . Probabilistic extreme climate loading is quantified in terms of its spatial magnitude vector To calculate risk we first represent an individual denotes a 'failed' : The ) when subjected to the external hazard : The damage associated with the failure of the asset. For the entire assets, functionality depends on all the asset , whose elements are either 0 or 1 which assets have failed and which have not failed. In particular network reliability, ard there are many possible failure combinations of assets that result in network failure. In the most exhaustive scenario there are possible failure state combinations, but in reality fewer combinations can capture most of the failures. The vector failure states and is defined here as a failure failure mechanism and of failure combinations that contribute to ) formulation proposed in this ) and damages e to multiple failure mechanisms, and (ii) repeating the calculations over multiple summarized in Figure 1 .
(1) Figure 1 . Framework for risk calculations required in the network failure analysis.
International Figure 2 shows a detailed flowchart for constructing component models and implementing a national infrastructure risk calculation framework that solves Equation (1) . The important components in the flowchart are explained as follows: Following this the direct and indirect spatial and demographic impact effects for asset damages and network losses can be quantified by assembling the footprints of all failed assets. For economic analysis purposes, the total network damage effects constitute direct economic losses due to infrastructure asset failures.
III. Risk implementation

Economic damage (loss) assessment (Component E):
The supply and demand side loss inputs are fed into an economic input-output model. Using the economic input-output analysis to find the disrupted equilibrium state we can generate the indirect losses and total losses ‫ݎ‪ሺ‬ܦ(‬ ሻ) due to the network failures.
6. Risk calculation (Component F): Network risk ܴሺ‫ܚ‬ҧ ሻ is computed when the reliability and damage estimations are implemented over multiple failure mechanisms and multiple hazards.
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IV. Case-study demonstration
Obtaining high quality data for the different components of the risk framework is very challenging, so models are employed wherever necessary. The case-study results shown here are synthetic but serve the important purpose of providing a template for risk calculations when real data is available. The risk methodology outlined in the sections above is implemented for simulated probabilistic hazard events that affect a sample topological electricity network for Great Britain. The network is a satisfactory topological representation of the actual electricity transmission network for Great Britain 15 . Further, the network nodes represent electricity substations that served customers over regions estimated from population census data 16 . Figure 3 (a) introduces the test network with nodes (substation) fragilities, magnified according to their relative values, after being intersected with a sample probabilistic spatial hazard event. This result is obtained by implementing the components A, B and C from the framework Figure  2 . Using Figure 3(a) we can identify the substations that are at most risk of failing. Based on the node fragilities and resulting network behaviors we can generate a sample of different possible failure mechanisms. This is shown in Figure 3(b) where the resulting damages in terms of International Symposium for Next Generation Infrastructure October 1-4, 2013, Wollongong, Australia customers affected are calculated for each direct and indirect failure mechanism. Hence, we are also able to obtain a range of possible risk outcomes from the analysis. Another outcome of the analysis is shown in Figure 4 where the ranges of risks (in £ millions) are calculated for multiple mechanisms across different hazard events (given by their exceedance probabilities). This result is obtained by executing the components D and F in the Figure 2 framework. Figure 4 captures the uncertainty of the risk analysis across a range of different infrastructure provisions. 
